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Property Convergence  
in Takings Law 
Maureen E. Brady* 
Abstract 
 
Although one of the key questions in a federal system is how authority 
should be allocated between the state and national governments, property 
law has rarely generated serious controversy on this front. Instead, property 
entitlements and the rules governing resource use have typically been the 
province of state and local actors. The Supreme Court has repeatedly em-
phasized that property rights are created at the state level. And while federal 
regulations—for example, environmental regulations—certainly limit prop-
erty rights, state and local land-use laws and state nuisance and trespass 
rules serve as major constraints on property’s use and enjoyment. This fea-
ture of property law means there is potential for interstate variation in prop-
erty rules. 
In the private law of property—the body of law that governs disputes 
and relationships among private parties—there remains some variation 
among the states in both the forms of property recognized and in the differ-
ent rules that limit ownership and use. However, in this Essay prepared for 
a symposium on federalism at the Pepperdine School of Law, I marshal evi-
dence that one portion of the public law of property is on a different trajec-
tory. 
This Essay identifies two areas of convergence across states in constitu-
tional takings law. First, though the federal Constitution could theoretically 
protect varied property interests and could measure the constitutionality of 
regulations affecting property against different background state legal re-
 
 * Associate Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law. Thanks to Jack Brady, 
Debbie Hellman, Kate Klonick, Cynthia Nicoletti, and Rich Schragger for helpful comments on ear-
lier drafts; to Tomi Olutoye and Alexander Snowdon for expert research assistance; and to Derek 
Muller and the Pepperdine Law Review editors, especially Kat Ellena, Cameron Fraser, Ashley 
Gebicke, Jake McIntosh, and Colten Stanberry, for hosting this Symposium and for their editorial 
assistance. 
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gimes, developments in takings doctrine have enabled some courts to make 
cross-state comparisons both to create or cap the interests protected and to 
determine which limitations on title an owner should have expected. Second, 
despite the potential for variation offered by state constitutional takings pro-
visions, state courts often interpret their constitutional protections for prop-
erty in similar ways even when presented with different text or other relevant 
considerations. This Essay identifies how lower courts are applying takings 
doctrine in ways that may curb the significance of interstate differences in 
property rules and speculates on the features of takings law that minimize 
variation in the scope of constitutional takings protection where the poten-
tial exists for it. In surfacing the phenomenon of convergence, this Essay 
builds a foundation for considering the virtues, vices, and normative desira-
bility of uniformity and variation in both takings law and in property law 
more generally. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Although one of the key questions in a federal system is how authority 
should be allocated between the state and national governments,1 property 
law has rarely generated serious controversy on this front.  Instead, property 
entitlements and the rules governing resource use have typically been the 
province of state and local actors.2  The Supreme Court has repeatedly em-
phasized that property rights are created at the state level.3  And while feder-
al regulations—for example, environmental regulations—certainly limit 
property rights, state and local land-use laws and state nuisance and trespass 
rules serve as major constraints on property’s use and enjoyment.4 
This feature of property law means there is significant potential for in-
terstate variation in property rules.  Scholars have suggested that the fact that 
property law is left to the states allows for doctrinal and regulatory innova-
tions and permits residents to agitate at a more local level for rules reflecting 
their preferences.5  There is some truth to these assertions.  It does not seem 
coincidental that the state of California offers artists and celebrities stronger 
 
 1. William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 665 (1990) (noting 
that the federal system divides “responsibilities among national, state, and local governments”). 
 2. See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Of Property and Federalism, 115 YALE L.J. 72, 
74 n.1 (2005) (noting that states are the traditional source of property law, while federal property law 
is generally “limited to the regulation of properties owned by the United States and intellectual prop-
erty law . . . .”); Stewart E. Sterk, Federal Land Use Regulation as Market Restoration, B.U. L. REV. 
(forthcoming), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3238139 (discussing issues re-
lated to federal limitations on local land-use regulations).  There are periodically calls for limiting 
state or local authority over property, particularly in the field of land use regulation, where the poten-
tial for spillovers is particularly high.  See generally Sterk, supra (manuscript at 4–6); Ashira Pelman 
Ostrow, Land Law Federalism, 61 EMORY L.J. 1397, 1406–07 (2012) (describing two different fed-
eral attempts “to coordinate land-use planning on a national scale”). 
 3. See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 482 (2005); Drye v. United States, 528 
U.S. 49, 58 (1999); Preseault v. I.C.C., 494 U.S. 1, 20 (1990) (O’Connor, J., concurring); Ruckel-
shaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1001 (1984). 
 4. Cf. Robert C. Ellickson, Panel I: Liberty, Property, and Environmental Ethics, 21 ECOLOGY 
L.Q. 397, 397 (1994) (bemoaning as “Beltway Syndrome” the way legal scholars focus on federal 
land controls at the expense of local controls). 
 5. E.g., Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 2, at 99–100; Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of 
Constitutional Property, 86 VA. L. REV. 885, 954 (2000); Ilya Somin, Federalism and Property 
Rights, 2011 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 53, 54 (2011).  For criticism of the notion that competitive decentral-
ization will necessarily lead to more preference satisfaction, innovation, or economic growth, see 
RICHARD C. SCHRAGGER, CITY POWER: URBAN GOVERNANCE IN A GLOBAL AGE 46–56 (2016); 
Richard C. Schragger, Decentralization and Development, 96 VA. L. REV. 1837, 1860 (2010); Rich-
ard Schragger, Consuming Government, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1824, 1831–34 (2003). 
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property (or property-like) rights in their likenesses and works than other 
states do.6  Some states are well-known for their strong environmental regu-
lations limiting property use, while other states are far more “lax.”7 
To be sure, in the private law of property—the body of law that governs 
disputes and relationships among private parties8—there remains some 
meaningful variation among the states in both particular forms of property 
recognized and in the different rules that limit ownership and use.9  Howev-
er, in this Essay, I marshal evidence that one portion of the public law of 
property is on a different trajectory.10  Property conflicts between private cit-
izens and the state are often channeled through the takings clauses, the con-
stitutional provisions that set limitations on the government’s ability to ac-
quire or regulate private property.11  This Essay describes how state-specific 
property law has become less salient when courts are resolving owner dis-
putes against governments, as opposed to other private parties.  It speculates 
on the features of takings law that cause convergence in the protections af-
 
 6. See Nestor M. Davidson, Standardization and Pluralism in Property Law, 61 VAND. L. REV. 
1597, 1608 (2008); see generally Paul Cirino, Note, Advertisers, Celebrities, and Publicity Rights in 
New York and California, 39 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 763 (1994). 
 7. See Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation: A Public Choice Analy-
sis, 115 HARV. L. REV. 553, 583 (2001) (stating that “many states are implementing innovative [en-
vironmental] protective measures” while other “states may prefer more lax environmental regula-
tion.”).  These economists “have generally found no strong association between environmental 
compliance costs and business location.” Mary Graham, Environmental Protection & the States: 
“Race to the Bottom” or “Race to the Bottom Line”?, BROOKINGS (Dec. 1, 1998), 
https://www.brookings.edu/articles/environmental-protection-the-states-race-to-the-bottom-or-race-
to-the-bottom-line/.  In other words, different environmental restrictions on property uses in different 
states may reflect the preferences of residents and local interest groups rather than attempts to lure 
either environmentally friendly or unfriendly firms.  See id. 
 8. Private Law, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1390 (10th ed. 2014). 
 9. See infra Part II. 
 10. See infra Part III.  In using the term public law here, I mean only to separate contexts in 
which the state is a party to the conflict involving the property owner from contexts in which dispu-
tants are solely private parties.  See Public Law, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1425 (10th ed. 2014) 
(defining “public law” as “[t]he body of law dealing with the relations between private individuals 
and the government”).  Of course, even when the government is involved in property disputes, pri-
vate law plays a role.  Cf. Richard A. Epstein, The Common Law Foundations of the Takings Clause: 
The Disconnect between Public and Private Law, 30 TOURO L. REV. 265, 265–66 (2014) (arguing 
that classification of takings law as “public law,” unmoored from private common law, has led to 
doctrinal confusion). 
 11. The federal and most state constitutions have “takings clauses.”  U.S. CONST. amend. V; e.g., 
ARIZ. CONST. art. 2, § 17; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 19; MD. CONST. art. III, § 40; MASS. CONST. pt. I, 
art. X; MICH. CONST. art. 10, § 2; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 13; N.J. CONST. art. I, § 20; N.Y. CONST. 
art. I, § 7, cl. a; PA. CONST. art. I, § 10. 
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forded to property, minimizing interstate variation in the scope of constitu-
tional protection where the potential exists for it. 
This Essay proceeds as follows.  In Part II, I describe the persistence of 
property variation in private law,12 and in Part III, two aspects of conver-
gence in constitutional takings law.13  First, though the federal Constitution 
could theoretically protect varied property interests and could measure the 
constitutionality of regulations affecting property against different back-
ground state legal regimes, developments in takings doctrine have enabled 
courts to make cross-state comparisons both to define the interests protected 
and to determine which limitations on title an owner should have expected.  
This means that courts are using a sort of national common law of property 
to determine the fate of claims for compensation.14  Second, despite the po-
tential for variation offered by state constitutional takings provisions, state 
courts often interpret their constitutional protections for property in similar 
ways even in the face of different text or other relevant considerations.15  
The aim of this Essay is largely descriptive: to identify how lower courts are 
applying takings doctrine in ways that may limit the significance of inter-
state differences in property rules.  In discussing these phenomena of con-
vergence, this Essay builds a firmer foundation for considering the virtues, 
vices, and normative desirability of uniformity and variation in both takings 
law and in property law more generally. 
II. PROPERTY VARIATION IN PRIVATE LAW 
All first-year law students in a Property course quickly learn that there 
can be a bewildering number of state-law variations on core property inter-
ests and doctrines.  Historically, there have been variations in the sorts of in-
terests recognized as property in different states.  Take conservation ease-
ments, which benefit easement holders by preventing landowners from 
developing or altering property in some way.16  Massachusetts recognized 
 
 12. See infra Part II. 
 13. See infra Part III. 
 14. See infra Section III.A. 
 15. See infra Section III.B; see also Gerald S. Dickinson, Federalism, Convergence, and Diver-
gence in Constitutional Property, 73 U. MIAMI L. REV. 139, 155–82 (2018) (exploring this form of 
convergence, state courts interpreting their constitutions in lockstep with the federal constitution).  
 16. See Jessica Owley Lippmann, The Emergence of Exacted Conservation Easements, 84 NEB. 
L. REV. 1043, 1044 n.1 (2006) (defining “conservation easements” as a “voluntary private land pro-
tection scheme[]”). 
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them a full fifty years before Wyoming passed a statute creating them.17  
Similarly, other forms of easements have emerged unevenly in different 
states, including easements or rights of access entitling owners to prevent 
nearby modifications to their means of entry and egress,18 or easements of 
view preventing neighbors from blocking the visibility of owners’ business-
es from the street.19  Variation is not limited to easements like these,20 and 
new variations continue to arise from time to time.21 
On top of the fact that states sometimes recognize different property in-
terests, state legislatures and courts have imposed different doctrinal limita-
tions on those property interests.  A few highlights may illustrate the point.  
Consider adverse possession, which famously entitles the possessor of prop-
erty to obtain title over the true owner with the passage of time; in some 
states, good faith is required for a valid adverse possession claim against an 
owner;22 in other states, the adverse possessor’s state of mind is irrelevant;23 
and for a time, at least in a few states, only a bad-faith adverse possessor 
could obtain title.24  State property laws also differentially limit who can 
 
 17. See id. at 1085–86.  Prior to passing the statute, some Wyoming residents were using more 
traditional property tools like covenants and equitable servitudes for conservation purposes.  Id. at 
1085 n.205. 
 18. Maureen E. Brady, Property’s Ceiling: State Courts and the Expansion of Takings Clause 
Property, 102 VA. L. REV. 1167, 1184–89 (2016). 
 19. Note, Abutting Landowner’s Easement of View, 5 N.Y. L. REV. 43, 43–46 (1927). 
 20. For a few other examples outside the servitude context, see Bell & Parchomovsky, supra 
note 2, at 74–75; Maureen E. Brady, Penn Central Squared: What the Many Factors of Murr v. Wis-
consin Mean for Property Federalism, 166 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 53, 60–61 (2017). 
 21. For example, in the last few years, New York has floated creating a property-like right to 
control one’s likeness that actors could transfer to heirs to prevent their appearance on-screen as 
computer-generated characters after their deaths.  Jennifer E. Rothman, New York Once Again Floats 
Right of Publicity Law, ROTHMAN’S ROADMAP TO THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY (June 7, 2017, 12:45 
PM), https://www.rightofpublicityroadmap.com/news-commentary/new-york-once-again-floats-
right-publicity-law.  Anyone whose likeness is used in New York could enforce this right, not just 
New York residents, so it would not have the same effect of creating uneven property entitlements 
afforded to residents of different states, but it is nonetheless an example of state innovation.  See id. 
 22. See, e.g., Croell Redi-Mix, Inc. v. Baltes, No. 08–0379, 2009 WL 778760, at *3 (Iowa Ct. 
App. Mar. 26, 2009) (stating that a valid adverse possession cause of action requires a good faith 
claim of right).  
 23. See, e.g., French v. Pearce, 8 Conn. 439, 443 (1831) (explaining that “it is the visible and 
adverse possession, with an intention to possess, that constitutes its adverse character, and not the 
remote views or belief of the possessor”). 
 24. See Preble v. Maine Cent. R.R. Co., 27 A. 149, 150 (Me. 1893), overruled by Dombkowski 
v. Ferland, 893 A.2d 599, 605–06 (Me. 2006) (abandoning the “Maine rule” approach to adverse 
possession by statute); see also Mannillo v. Gorski, 255 A.2d 258, 262 (N.J. 1969) (describing the 
Maine rule and the New Jersey court’s decision to disavow its previous adherence to that rule). 
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possess property interests.  The grantor of a parcel can reserve an easement 
in favor of a third party in some states but not in others.25  Laws governing 
access to natural resources also change depending on the state in which they 
are located;26 Oregon recognizes customary rights entitling the public to ac-
cess beaches,27 while New Hampshire expressly rejects those rights.28  And 
the tort of nuisance may partly owe its reputation as a “legal garbage can” to 
the plethora of nuisance rules that proliferate across state borders.29  Right to 
farm laws immunize agricultural operations from nuisance liability to differ-
ent extents in different states,30 and the tests for determining whether an ac-
tivity is a nuisance differ as well.31  The amount of variation in property law 
even decades ago led one law professor to criticize the American Law Insti-
tute’s effort to write a Restatement of Property as “impossible from its in-
ception.  There is no ‘American law of property,’ and there can be none so 
long as the present federal system of government persists.”32 
Why is there variation in state property law?  As explained at the outset, 
courts and scholars often repeat the maxim that property is a creature of state 
law,33 and whenever authority over a body of law is reserved to the states, it 
 
 25. Compare Estate of Thomson v. Wade, 509 N.E.2d 309, 310 (N.Y. 1987) (holding that a third 
party is a “stranger to the deed” and cannot be the beneficiary of an easement by reservation), and 
Pitman v. Sweeney, 661 P.2d 153, 154 (Wash. Ct. App. 1983) (using the same rule), with Willard v. 
First Church of Christ, Scientist, Pacifica, 498 P.2d 987, 991 (Cal. 1972) (in bank) (joining Ken-
tucky and Oregon in abandoning the “stranger to the deed” rule). 
 26. See Maureen E. Brady, Defining "Navigability": Balancing State-Court Flexibility and Pri-
vate Rights in Waterways, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 1415, 1420, 1424–27 (2015) (cataloging different 
common law definitions of “navigable” for the purposes of defining “the scope of the public trust”). 
 27. Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 2, at 95 n.124. 
 28. See Stewart E. Sterk, The Federalist Dimension of Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence, 114 
YALE L.J. 203, 223 (2004) (noting these different rules in Oregon and New Hampshire). 
 29. See Ronald G. Aronovsky, Federalism and CERCLA: Rethinking the Role of Federal Law in 
Private Cleanup Cost Disputes, 33 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 71 (2006) (“[N]uisance law . . . varies dramati-
cally from state to state.”); William L. Prosser, Nuisance Without Fault, 20 TEX. L. REV. 399, 410 
(1942) (coining the term “legal garbage can”). 
 30. Alexander A. Reinert, Note, The Right to Farm: Hog-Tied and Nuisance-Bound, 73 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 1694, 1695 (1998). 
 31. EMILY DOSKOW & LINA GUILLEN, NEIGHBOR LAW: FENCES, TREES, BOUNDARIES & NOISE 
230–33 (9th ed. 2017). 
 32. William R. Vance, The Restatement of the Law of Property, 86 U. PA. L. REV. 173, 178 
(1937). 
 33. See, e.g., D. Benjamin Barros, Note, Defining "Property" in the Just Compensation Clause, 
63 FORDHAM L. REV. 1853, 1879–81 (1995); Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 2, at 74 n.1; James 
Y. Stern, Property’s Constitution, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 277, 286 (2013). 
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creates the potential for differences.34  But some have argued that states have 
special institutional expertise over the property within their borders.35  In the 
heyday of “federal common law,” when federal courts sitting in diversity ju-
risdiction considered themselves free to ignore state common law rulings, 
federal tribunals nonetheless deferred to the state common law of property as 
a quintessentially “local” issue.36  Federal courts today routinely list family 
law and property law as areas where they should abstain or defer to allow 
“expert” state courts to resolve ambiguities in the doctrine.37  Furthermore, 
jurists and scholars often suggest that state actors need flexibility to tailor 
property rules to particularities within their jurisdictions.38  Any court deci-
sion that threatens to have the collateral effect of freezing the state’s com-
mon law of property is criticized as preventing judges and legislators from 
adapting their state’s property law to future local circumstances.39 
Of course, no one suggests that variation is an unmitigated good.  First, 
more rules or interests does not necessarily mean better rules or interests.40  
Indeed, property doctrines seem to spawn a handful of variations rather than 
fifty different approaches.41  In some instances, a rule arising in one jurisdic-
 
 34. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 42 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (discussing how the 
states are laboratories of federalism as each state has the authority to define their own laws in novel 
ways). 
 35. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 482 (2005) (emphasizing that the federal 
government owed “great respect” to “state legislatures and state courts in discerning local public 
needs”); Somin, supra note 5, at 54 (noting that arguments for federalism in the property context 
invoke “superior knowledge and expertise of state and local governments in catering to the diverse 
needs of their communities”). 
 36. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1, 18 (1842), overruled by Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 
(1938); see W. David Sarratt, Note, Judicial Takings and the Course Pursued, 90 VA. L. REV. 1487, 
1528 (2004).  But see Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 
TEX. L. REV. 1321, 1413–14 (2001) (noting that federal courts still sometimes meddled in property 
law in the era of Swift v. Tyson). 
 37. See, e.g., Kelo, 545 U.S. at 482; San Remo Hotel v. City and Cty. of San Francisco, 545 U.S. 
323, 347 (2005); LoCurto v. LoCurto, No. 07 Civ. 8238 (NRB), 2008 WL 4410091, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. 
Sept. 25, 2008); W. Hartford Initiative to Save Historic Prop. v. Town of West Hartford, No. 3:06–
CV–739 (RNC), 2006 WL 2401441, at *7 (D. Conn. Aug. 18, 2006); In re Sweet, No. 6:12–bk–
03271–KSJ, 2012 WL 5555004, at *2 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Nov. 15, 2012); In re Carter, 156 B.R. 768, 
771 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1993); In re Desmarais, 33 B.R. 27, 29 (Bankr. D. Me. 1983). 
 38. See Frank I. Michelman, Property as a Constitutional Right, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1097, 
1104 (1981). 
 39. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1068–69 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting); 
Timothy M. Mulvaney, The New Judicial Takings Construct, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 247, 262 
(2011); see also Brady, supra note 26, at 1450 (describing this as the “ossification problem”). 
 40. See, e.g., Michelman, supra note 38, at 1104. 
 41. See Richard A. Epstein, Takings, Exclusivity and Speech: The Legacy of PruneYard v. Rob-
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tion may have such desirable consequences that it should be adopted every-
where; other times, different rules more effectively address different condi-
tions, expectations, or preferences in different places.  Second, Thomas Mer-
rill and Henry Smith have rightly pointed out that a sort of “numerus 
clausus” principle operates to limit variation in property: property rights tend 
to be structured in a limited number of standardized forms to reduce the in-
formation costs to all third parties needing to ascertain who holds which 
rights.42  This principle has undoubtedly reduced variation, certainly as a 
matter of judicial lawmaking, although legislatures have still been responsi-
ble for significant innovations in property rights in different states.43  Final-
ly, to recognize the existence of variation is not to say that all innovations or 
variations are good.44  States have long created property interests that are 
economically inefficient or morally abhorrent45—though one can argue that 
these interests should be relegated to the fringe or eliminated without argu-
ing against variation itself.46 
On the whole, however, variation has rarely been criticized, except per-
haps by the fiercest advocates of uniformity (or perhaps by first-year law 
students approaching final exams and frantically memorizing various state 
rules).47  To the contrary, scholars and judges have often suggested that 
states have expertise on property, and innovation and experimentation are 
viewed as systemic benefits.48  In lieu of proposals for standardization, “it is 
a commonplace of Our Federalism that [rules of property] are left for defini-
tion by bodies of state law that the States are free to shape as they severally 
 
ins, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 21, 41 (1997) (“[T]he level of agreement across states is far greater than is 
sometimes supposed, in part because of the unifying forces created by the Restatements and the 
standard treatises on the subject.”). 
 42. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The 
Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 3, 9–12 (2000).  For example, there are a finite num-
ber and fairly uniform types of freehold and leasehold interests in each state.  See id. at 11. 
 43. Id. at 9–12, 58–60. 
 44. See Michelman, supra note 38, at 1104. 
 45. See, e.g., id. 
 46. Cf. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 42 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (the beauty of feder-
alism is that if one state tries an inefficient or morally abhorrent “experiment,” the other states are 
free to reject it). 
 47. See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Why Restate the Bundle?  The Disintegration of 
the Restatement of Property, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 681, 692–93 (2014) (noting that the Restatement of 
Property project veered toward advocating for reform in ways consonant with a move toward “uni-
form” legislation).  
 48. See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 2, at 78–79; Merrill, supra note 5, at 954. 
[Vol. 46: 695, 2019] Property Convergence in Takings Law 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
705 
choose.”49 
III. PROPERTY CONVERGENCE IN TAKINGS LAW 
Despite the persistence of some variations in property doctrines as a 
matter of private law, a different phenomenon occurs in one of property’s 
public law applications: takings.  In general terms, the takings clauses of the 
state and federal constitutions prevent private property from being taken for 
public use without just compensation.50  This is the area of property law that 
most empowers property owners against both direct confiscation and confis-
catory regulation—“regulatory takings”—by federal, state, and local gov-
ernments.  The Supreme Court has enabled interstate variation in the appli-
cation of the federal Takings Clause by emphasizing the role of 
nonconstitutional state property law in defining both what counts as consti-
tutional property and in measuring whether a taking has occurred.51  As a re-
sult, the differences among states in both the specific property interests pro-
tected and in regulatory and doctrinal limitations on those interests could 
lead to differences in the operation of the Takings Clause in different states.  
Similarly, as a matter of state takings law, differences in state constitutional 
text and history could lead to different levels of protection against confisca-
tion.52  Nevertheless, takings law is often marked by convergence, rather 
than variation. 
 
 49. Frank I. Michelman, Property, Federalism, and Jurisprudence: A Comment on Lucas and 
Judicial Conservatism, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 301, 310 (1993); see also Merrill, supra note 5, at 
954 (noting that because the Constitution “does not require that constitutional property be created in 
any particular form,” it “permits substantial experimentation and evolution of property institutions 
over time”). 
 50. U.S. CONST. amend. V; e.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. 2, § 17; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 19; MD. CONST. 
art. III, § 40; MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. X; MICH. CONST. art. 10, § 2; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 13; N.J. 
CONST. art. I, § 20; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. a; PA. CONST. art. I, § 10. 
 51. The Supreme Court has not defined the constitutional terms “property” and “taken” in a way 
that would limit interstate variation—for example, by defining “property” as “land.” Instead, the 
definitions incorporate positive state law.  See Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 164 
(1998); Sterk, supra note 28, at 222–24.  
 52. See JEFFREY S. SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS: STATES AND THE MAKING OF AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 16–19 (2018) (noting how different provisions and other local considerations 
might change states’ approaches to constitutional interpretation). 
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A. Federal Takings Law and Defining Reasonableness 
Though the same federal Takings Clause applies to the actions of the 
federal government, and state and local governments,53 the Clause need not 
apply identically across state borders.  First, because property interests can 
vary by state,54 a type of interest recognized in one place may not exist, let 
alone be protected, by the Constitution in another.55  Second, in the regulato-
ry takings context, the Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed the role of 
background state property law in analyzing whether a taking has occurred.56  
Several of the Court’s tests examine whether a regulation “takes” by exam-
ining how the owner’s title or expectations were limited by pre-existing cir-
cumstances, including background law.57  Differences in background state 
law could make a regulation a taking in one jurisdiction, but not in another, 
because identically situated owners would be operating under different 
background constraints.58  To borrow an example developed by Stewart 
Sterk, Oregon has long recognized customary rights for the public to use 
dry-sand beach areas, whereas New Hampshire has specifically rejected 
those rights.59  If the same regulation were passed in both states forbidding 
owners from building structures in the dry-sand portion of the beach, the 
New Hampshire owner would seem to have a stronger claim that his or her 
property rights were interfered with than a similarly situated Oregon owner, 
because the Oregon owner even before the regulation could not have imped-
 
 53. See Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 233–34 (1897); Michael Graf, 
Application of Takings Law to the Regulation of Unpatented Mining Claims, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 57, 
75 n.92 (1997). 
 54. See Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 164 (1998) (“Because the Constitution 
protects rather than creates property interests, the existence of a property interest is determined by 
reference to ‘existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state 
law.’”  (quoting Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972))); Ruckelshaus v. 
Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1001 (1984) (quoting Bd. of Regents of State Colls., 408 U.S. at 577); 
Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 161 (1980) (quoting Bd. of Regents of 
State Colls., 408 U.S. at 577); Brady, supra note 20, at 59–63.  
 55. See Merrill, supra note 5, at 952–54 (noting that although “property” is a federal constitu-
tional term, state actors can create interests that meet that bar in any form, allowing “experimenta-
tion and evolution of property institutions over time.”). 
 56. See Sterk, supra note 28, at 206 (stating that protection against unconstitutional takings heav-
ily depends on background state law principles).  
 57. See id. at 226. 
 58. Id. at 233. 
 59. Id. at 223. 
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ed the public’s customary rights by building structures in that location.60 
Although these tests leave open the prospect of some variation among 
states, courts have adopted interpretations of the federal Takings Clause that 
facilitate convergence.  There are signs that courts are using interstate com-
parisons to affect the scope of takings protection for property in two ways: 
first, by using interstate comparisons to create the background state law 
against which an owner’s expectations are judged, and second, by using in-
terstate comparisons to create or limit the unit or type of property recognized 
as constitutionally salient for federal purposes. 
A potential cause of this phenomenon is the use of “reasonableness” and 
similar terms in Takings Clause cases.61  This is not unique to takings; 
throughout constitutional law, “reasonableness” has moved from its common 
law roots into all sorts of constitutional settings.62  An inherent problem with 
reasonableness is this: what counts as reasonable may vary depending on the 
chosen comparators.63  If asking whether a person’s conduct is reasonable, 
considerations relating to age, professional background, knowledge, and 
other experiences may change the calculus.64  If asking whether a govern-
ment’s law or policy is reasonable, one may get different answers if compar-
ing the action against a jurisdiction’s own history and laws versus examining 
broader trends across states.65  Reasonableness raises these problems in the 
takings context.  As this Section identifies, the unclear parameters of reason-
ableness have permitted courts to measure property and takings by reference 
to the rules and interests protected in other states, which has altered the po-
tential that otherwise exists for interstate variation. 
The history of reasonableness relating to the takings law phrase “in-
 
 60. See id. 
 61. See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979) (discussing whether a taking has 
occurred based on a factors test, including “its interference with reasonable investment backed ex-
pectations”).  
 62. Brandon L. Garrett, Constitutional Reasonableness, 102 MINN. L. REV. 61, 61 (2017) (“The 
concept of reasonableness pervades constitutional doctrine.”). 
 63. Id. at 61–62 (“[T]he underlying concept of reasonableness that courts adopt varies, with 
judges using competing objective, subjective, utility-based, or custom-based standards. . . .  The use 
of the common term reasonableness to such different ends can blur distinctions between rights and 
remedies.”). 
 64. See id. at 72–73. 
 65. See generally Brandon L. Garrett, Local Evidence in Constitutional Interpretation, 103 
CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 6-8), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abs 
tract_id=3133213 (discussing the Supreme Court’s reliance on state law when interpreting the Con-
stitution in order to help form a general consensus).  
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vestment-backed expectations” is illustrative.  This phrase comes from Penn 
Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, which set forth three factors 
for courts to examine in determining whether a regulation is a taking: “the 
character of the governmental action,” “[t]he economic impact of the regula-
tion on the claimant,” and “the extent to which the regulation has interfered 
with distinct investment-backed expectations.”66  The notion of investment-
backed expectations originated in Frank Michelman’s 1967 article “Proper-
ty, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of ‘Just 
Compensation’ Law.”67  In analyzing the Supreme Court’s few takings cases 
prior to that date, Michelman observed that it would oversimplify the 
Court’s takings analysis to focus primarily on the magnitude of the diminu-
tion in value suffered by the property owner.68  Instead, Michelman asserted 
that, as a descriptive matter, the takings test primarily examined “whether or 
not the measure in question can easily be seen to have practically deprived 
the claimant of some distinctly perceived, sharply crystallized, investment-
backed expectation.”69  To give meaning to this language, Michelman as-
serted that courts would be more likely to find a taking had occurred when a 
regulation banned an established use as opposed to one not yet undertaken; 
courts would be unlikely to find a taking when a landowner had not “yet 
formed any specific plans for his vacant land.”70 
Eighteen months after the Penn Central opinion invoked “distinct in-
vestment-backed expectations,” the language changed almost imperceptibly 
in Kaiser Aetna v. United States.71  In a garden-variety physical takings case 
involving the conversion of a private pond to a public aquatic park, Justice 
Rehnquist briefly canvassed all of takings law, including the recently decid-
ed Penn Central case, noting that it had declared “interference with reason-
able investment backed expectations” to be an important analytical factor in 
 
 66. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 
 67. Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations 
of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1213 (1967).  For the observation that 
Michelman is the source of this factor, see Steven J. Eagle, The Regulatory Takings Notice Rule, 24 
U. HAW. L. REV. 533, 557 (2002); Lynda J. Oswald, Cornering the Quark: Investment-Backed Ex-
pectations and Economically Viable Uses in Takings Analysis, 70 WASH. L. REV. 91, 100–01 (1995). 
 68. Michelman, supra note 67, at 1233. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 1233–34. 
 71. 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).  Penn Central was decided on June 26, 1978.  Id. at 104.  Kaiser 
Aetna v. United States, the case that slightly changed the test, was decided on December 4, 1979.  
444 U.S. 164, 164, 175 (1979). 
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the regulatory takings context.72  This shift from “distinct” expectations to 
“reasonable” expectations was almost certainly not intended to change the 
analysis.73  But some have suggested that distinctness and reasonableness 
carry different meanings, even if the Supreme Court and some lower courts 
use the terms interchangeably.74  To determine the “distinctness” of an own-
er’s expectations, Michelman suggested courts would likely focus on the 
property owner’s plans and expenditures of capital in light of what the prior 
legal framework permitted.75  To determine reasonableness, on the other 
hand, courts have used a much wider range of considerations to assess the 
property owner’s behavior.76 
The difference between distinctness and reasonableness may not be as 
significant as that view would suggest.77  For instance, just as “reasonable-
ness” implies limitations on constitutionally cognizable expectations about 
 
 72. Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 165–66, 175 (emphasis added). 
 73. J. David Breemer, Playing the Expectations Game: When Are Investment-Backed Land Use 
Expectations (Un)Reasonable in State Courts?, 38 URB. LAW. 81, 85–86 (2006) (referring to this 
change as “seem[ingly] inadvertent”); Calvert G. Chipchase, From Grand Central to the Sierras: 
What Do We Do with Investment-Backed Expectations in Partial Regulatory Takings?, 23 VA. 
ENVTL. L.J. 43, 56–66 (2004) (noting that “[t]he change was made without comment and seemingly 
without purpose”); Eagle, supra note 67, at 560–61 (“[I]t is not clear that Kaiser Aetna in fact in-
tended to mandate governmental review of the plausibility of owners’ views.”).  In addition, the au-
thorship of the Kaiser Aetna opinion lends further support to the idea that a change in meaning was 
not intended, or at least not one that would harm property owners; Justice Rehnquist was “a strong 
proponent of robust Fifth Amendment private property protections.”  Chipchase, supra, at 59; see 
Eagle, supra note 67, at 560–61. 
 74. See, e.g., Presbytery of Seattle v. King County, 787 P.2d 907, 915 n.29 (Wash. 1990); Chip-
chase, supra note 73, at 60 n.104 (collecting Supreme Court cases in which “reasonable” and “dis-
tinct” are used interchangeably in takings clause issues). 
 75. See Michelman, supra note 67, at 1233–34. 
 76. Michael M. Berger, Happy Birthday, Constitution: The Supreme Court Establishes New 
Ground Rules for Land-Use Planning, 20 URB. LAW. 735, 765–67 (1988); see Breemer, supra note 
73, at 85–86 (“[W]hatever its purpose in Kaiser Aetna, the use of the term ‘reasonable’ invited ex-
amination of the validity of a claimant’s expectations rather than examination of the effect of regula-
tion in precluding distinctly planned, profitable uses of land.” (emphasis omitted)); Chipchase, supra 
note 73, at 57 (“The term ‘distinct’ thus directs a claimant to produce evidence showing that she in-
tended to develop her property in the manner alleged and that she expended capital in furtherance of 
those plans.  In contrast, the term ‘reasonable,’ or ‘reasonably prudent,’ implies that courts are to 
determine whether the claimant’s demonstrated expectations were appropriate or justified given the 
circumstances of the case.” (footnotes omitted)); Eagle, supra note 67, at 560 (“After all, ‘expecta-
tions’ are individualistic and possibly idiosyncratic views of the world.  ‘Reasonableness,’ on the 
other hand, implies both the individual judgment and the societal determination that the judgment is 
at least plausible.”). 
 77. See Chipchase, supra note 73, at 60 n.104 (showing how different cases have used the words 
“reasonable” and “distinct” interchangeably or not at all).  
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property,78 there are surely limits on the “distinct” expectations that might 
form the basis for a takings claim.79  Compensation is a means of redressing 
a loss: the ability to control the “destinies” of one’s things and the psycho-
logical and economic harm resulting from that deprivation of control.80  But 
control is always finite.  Both distinct and reasonable investment-backed ex-
pectations have boundaries affected by preexisting state-specific regulations 
and common-law limitations.81  And preexisting law may not furnish the on-
ly limitation: as Carol Rose observed, takings law has long been a “muddle” 
because it requires mediating between owners’ expectations and the civic 
duties all members of a community share to not harm one another or the 
public at large.82  While there have been critics of the ad hoc reasoning in-
volved in assessing owner expectations and evaluating whether compensa-
 
 78. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1005–07 (1984) (noting that “[a] ‘reasona-
ble investment-backed expectation’ must be more than a ‘unilateral expectation or an abstract 
need,’” for despite Monsanto’s unilateral interest in the secrecy of its data, existing EPA regulations 
concerning confidentiality put limits on Monsanto’s property interest (quoting Webb’s Fabulous 
Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 161 (1980))); Forest Props., Inc. v. United States, 39 
Fed. Cl. 56, 76 (Fed. Cl. 1997) (“A regulatory scheme affecting the property at issue at the time of 
purchase can significantly discount an owner’s investment-backed expectations with respect to the 
property.  In fact, numerous courts have found that a regulatory structure can thoroughly abrogate a 
property owner’s investment-backed expectations.”); City of Dallas v. VRC LLC, 260 S.W.3d 60, 
66 (Tex. App. 2008) (“We consider existing law regulating the use of property in determining 
whether the regulation interferes with investment-backed expectations . . . .”). 
 79. See Chipchase, supra note 73, at 65–66 (discussing limits on distinct expectations). 
 80. Cf. Michelman, supra note 67, at 1234 (noting that the need for compensation depends on the 
assumptions that individuals control the destinies of their “things” and that deprivation of that con-
trol is injurious in some way to the individual). 
 81. See id. at 1029-30 (noting that where “background principles of the State’s law of property 
and nuisance” place limits on land ownership, no taking has occurred); Stop the Beach Renourish-
ment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S. 702, 728 (2010) (plurality opinion) (suggesting that 
court decisions may trigger Takings Clause if “what had been private property under established law 
no longer is.”); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Comm’n, 505 U.S. 1003, 1034–35 (1992) (Kenne-
dy, J., concurring) (suggesting “the whole of our legal tradition,” beyond simply common law, 
should be used to determine the reasonableness of an owner’s expectations).  Thus, members of the 
Court have often conceptualized existing legal limits on uses of property as a natural termination 
point for takings protection.  Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029–30 (majority opinion); Id. at 1034–35 (Kenne-
dy, J., concurring); Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 560 U.S. at 728.  There are, of course, very 
close cases under either term, such as one identified by Michelman, where an individual purchases 
property in the midst of a public debate about some specific future restraint on its use.  Michelman, 
supra note 67, at 1238. 
 82. See Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue is Still a Muddle, 57 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 561, 594–97 (1984); see also Joseph William Singer, The Ownership Society and Tak-
ings of Property: Castles, Investments, and Just Obligations, 30 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 309, 336 
(2006) (“The question of justice and fairness does not relieve us of the burden of judgment, and 
that—perhaps more than any other reason—explains why it is the right question.”). 
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tion is required,83 some balancing of the owner’s subjective intentions 
against external limitations is probably inevitable in fairly accommodating 
the competing interests of the owner and society with respect to how proper-
ty is held and used.84 
The operative question, then, is what considerations and comparisons 
should be involved in a holistic analysis of “distinctness” or “reasonable-
ness.”  Courts have approached this question in different ways,85 but some 
have begun treating other states’ laws as considerations affecting the legiti-
macy or plausibility of an owner’s investment-backed expectations.86  In 
Wisconsin, for example, the state court of appeals treated the fact that 
 
 83. See Stephen Durden, Unprincipled Principles: The Takings Clause Exemplar, 3 ALA. C.R. & 
C.L. L. REV. 25, 27–28 (2013). 
 84. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 542 (2005) (“[T]he Takings Clause is 
meant ‘to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fair-
ness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.’” (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 
364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  There are some circumstances where 
per se rules derive from this fairness principle—for example, the uncontroversial takings case where 
land is condemned for a highway.  Richard Kahn, Inverse Condemnation and the Highway Cases: 
Compensation for Abutting Landowners, 22 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 563, 564 (1995) (“[V]irtually 
all courts would allow compensation if even the tiniest fraction of private property was condemned 
for a right of way for highway construction.”).  In most cases about inverse condemnations through 
regulation, however, courts approach the fairness question by ad hoc balancing.  Lucas, 505 U.S. at 
1015 (“[W]e have generally eschewed any set formula for determining how far is too far, preferring 
to ‘engag[e] in . . . essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries.’” (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of 
New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); cf. Brady, supra note 26, 
at 1456–59 (advocating a balancing approach in the judicial takings context so that “courts will still 
have a fair degree of power to modify their law within reasonable parameters, but the Takings 
Clause will prevent the most egregious eliminations of property rights”). 
 85. See Berger, supra note 76, at 765–67; Robert M. Washburn, “Reasonable Investment-Backed 
Expectations” as a Factor in Defining Property Interest, 49 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 63, 
63, 69–71 (1996).  Preliminary research suggests there may be other factors besides those listed in 
these articles, and in several cases, courts suggested that it is unreasonable for owners to develop 
expectations if state actors have not affirmatively permitted or promised them the ability to do what 
they are now restrained from doing.  See State Dep’t of Nat. Res. v. Arctic Slope Reg’l Corp., 834 
P.2d 134, 140 (Alaska 1991); Columbia Venture, LLC v. Richland County, 776 S.E.2d 900, 914 
(S.C. 2015).  Other times, courts imply that if a property type or use is often regulated, future inter-
ferences with that property interest are more foreseeable and thus unlikely to give rise to claims for 
compensation.  Me. Educ. Ass’n Benefits Tr. v. Cioppa, 695 F.3d 145, 154 (1st Cir. 2012); Golden 
Pac. Bancorp v. United States, 15 F.3d 1066, 1074 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Brace v. United States, 72 Fed. 
Cl. 337, 354–55 (Fed. Cl. 2006); Turntable Fishery & Moorage Corp. v. United States, 52 Fed. Cl. 
256, 261 (Fed. Cl. 2002); Brakke v. Iowa Dep’t of Nat. Res., 897 N.W.2d 522, 550 (Iowa 2017); 
Canal Ins. Co. v. Hopkins, 238 S.W.3d 549, 570 (Tex. App. 2007). 
86 See Hawkeye Commodity Promotions, Inc. v. Vilsack, 486 F.3d 430, 442 (8th Cir. 2007); Int’l 
Ass’n of Machinists Dist. 10 & Its Local Lodge 1061 v. State, 903 N.W.2d 141, 151 (Wis. Ct. App. 
2017). 
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“twenty-five other states” had enacted right-to-work laws as constraining un-
ions’ expectations with respect to the property in their union treasuries.87  
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held in another decision that a property 
owner’s experience with a video-poker ban in South Carolina should have 
led them to expect that their property—video-poker machines—might be-
come regulated into valuelessness in Iowa.88  Though other courts have reit-
erated the importance of using state-specific law in takings inquiries,89 these 
examples illustrate that the unclear parameters of “reasonableness” in the 
Penn Central analysis90 can permit different state regulations to limit proper-
ty owners’ expectations regardless of jurisdictional boundaries.  Property 
owners’ constitutional rights can be limited by a sort of multijurisdictional or 
national property law—an amalgam of state common law and statutory re-
strictions elevated to constitutional significance.91 
Reasonableness has recently found its way into a second portion of the 
takings analysis: the definition of “property” and the so-called “denominator 
problem,” which refers to difficulties in ascertaining the relevant property 
interest on which a regulation operates.92  The problem arises whenever liti-
 
 87. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists Dist. 10, 903 N.W.2d at 151. 
 88. Hawkeye Commodity Promotions, Inc., 486 F.3d at 442. 
 89. See Preseault v. United States, 100 F.3d 1525, 1538-39 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (plurality opinion) 
(criticizing the government’s attempt to “use . . . federal law as well as state law in selecting the rel-
evant ‘background principles’” for determining restrictions on owner’s expectations); id. at 1556, 
1561 & n.6 (Clevenger, J., dissenting) (analyzing Vermont law closely to ascertain the scope of an 
easement property interest). 
 90. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 137–38 (1978). 
 91. Cf. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 500, 506 (1987) (sug-
gesting that claims based on the “unique support estate” recognized in Pennsylvania are “legalistic”). 
The Keystone Court rejected the plaintiff’s claim that a coal regulation constituted a taking, even 
though the challenged regulation was quite similar to the regulation held to be a taking in the earlier 
case of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).  In deciding Pennsylvania Coal, 
the Court found it significant that Pennsylvania recognized a “support estate” separately transferable 
from either the surface land or the coal rights, essentially allowing surface and mineral rights to trade 
the right to cause or be free from subsidence.  260 U.S. at 415.  Yet the Keystone Court seemed to 
minimize the importance of this unusual Pennsylvania property interest: “Petitioners therefore argue 
that even if comparable legislation in another State would not constitute a taking, the Subsidence Act 
has that consequence because it entirely destroys the value of their unique support estate.  It is clear, 
however, that our takings jurisprudence forecloses reliance on such legalistic distinctions within a 
bundle of property rights.”  480 U.S. at 500.  Despite this language that could be read to minimize 
the importance of state-specific law, the Court still claimed to rely on “Pennsylvania law” in reach-
ing its takings-related conclusions.  Id. 
 92. See Brady, supra note 20, at 53–54; Danaya C. Wright, A New Time for Denominators: To-
ward A Dynamic Theory of Property in the Regulatory Takings Relevant Parcel Analysis, 34 ENVTL. 
L. 175, 190–93 (2004). 
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gants dispute the proper unit for conducting the takings analysis: one parcel 
or multiple parcels possessed by the same owner, or a particular legal estate 
or property right versus a combination of them.93  A regulation may drasti-
cally reduce the value of a small unit of property but work only a partial 
diminution of use and value on a larger unit.94  In other words, deciding on a 
denominator may affect the subsequent resolution of a takings case.95 
The Supreme Court’s most recent discussion of the denominator prob-
lem occurred in 2017, in Murr v. Wisconsin.96  The case concerned a regula-
tion that rendered a family unable to sell or develop one of their two small 
waterfront lots; when the lots came under common ownership, they were 
“merged” and could no longer be separately sold or built upon.97  The ques-
tion was whether the lower court should use the single undeveloped water-
front parcel as the unit for evaluating the family’s takings claim or whether 
the court should use two neighboring parcels owned by the family, which 
would make the diminution in value far smaller.98  In instructing courts how 
to resolve the denominator inquiry, the Court laid out three factors: (1) the 
treatment of the property under state law, including lot lines and reasonable 
restrictions affecting use and disposition of the property;99 (2) the physical 
characteristics of the property, including its topography, the surrounding en-
vironment, and whether it is in an area “likely to become subject to, envi-
ronmental or other regulation[;]”100 and (3) any value effects of the regula-
tion, such as whether the burden on one portion increases the value on 
another portion or the two portions taken together, suggesting multiple units 
are in a “special relationship” and should be considered a single unit.101  
Overall, “[t]he endeavor should determine whether reasonable expectations 
about property ownership would lead a landowner to anticipate that his hold-
 
 93. See Wright, supra note 92, at 190 (explaining that in the regulatory takings context, “the 
problem lies in identifying the bundle from which a particular property right has been taken”). 
 94. Id. at 191 (explaining that if a landowner has ten acres that are fully developable except for 
one acre of undevelopable wetlands, then the landowner’s loss from the regulatory taking depends 
on whether that one acre or the whole ten acres serve as the denominator). 
 95. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1054 (1992) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) 
(“[W]hether the owner has been deprived of all economic value of his property will depend on how 
‘property’ is defined.”). 
 96. 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1938 (2017). 
 97. Id. at 1941. 
 98. Id. at 1941-42. 
 99. Id. at 1945. 
 100. Id. at 1945-46. 
 101. Id. at 1946. 
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ings would be treated as one parcel, or, instead, as separate tracts.”102 
Several parts of this denominator test invite convergence.103  The Murr 
majority opinion uses the word “reasonable” twenty-one times—and that 
does not include permutations like “reasonably” and “unreasonable.”104  
While, again, reasonableness or a balancing approach may be appropriate in 
the denominator inquiry,105 the term reasonableness is open-ended enough to 
raise questions about the proper comparators without further specification.106 
Both reasonableness and likeliness are invoked in the Murr test in facially 
broad ways: courts are to consider the role of “reasonable restriction[s]” on 
the owner’s land and whether the property is “likely to become subject to[] 
environmental or other regulation.”107  If experience with “reasonable in-
vestment-backed expectations” is any guide, courts may use the laws of oth-
er states to decide what it is reasonable for property owners to expect or 
what was likely to limit the property owner’s uses of land.108  Indeed, in the 
Murr opinion itself, the Court suggested that the provision rendering one of 
the Murrs’ lots undevelopable was a reasonable restriction on their owner-
ship because merger provisions had been around for “nearly a century,”109 as 
compared to the Wisconsin law that merged their parcels, which was eight-
een years old.110  The basis for this claim about the well-settled history of 
 
 102. Id. at 1945. 
 103. See Brady, supra note 20, at 66 (“Murr represents a new and different threat to property fed-
eralism than these previous rulings. . . . [because it] permits courts applying federal takings law to 
incorporate the property law of other jurisdictions to determine the scope of the interests protect-
ed.”). 
 104. See Murr, 137 S. Ct at 1939-50. 
 105. See Lost Tree Vill. Corp. v. United States, 707 F.3d 1286, 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (stating that 
the court takes a holistic, “flexible approach” to the denominator question, which is “designed to 
account for factual nuances” (quoting Loveladies Harbor, Inc., v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171, 1181 
(Fed. Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Brady, supra note 20, at 70 (noting 
that “[t]he Murr majority was not necessarily wrong to adopt a nuanced, flexible approach to the 
denominator problem” and that “courts need flexibility”). 
 106. See Brady, supra note 20, at 70 (stating the Murr factors are “perplexing and untried,” mak-
ing the test “impossibly vague, unpredictable, and confused”). 
 107. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1945-46 (emphases added). 
 108. See Brady, supra note 20, at 67–68 (discussing how a new regulation on a property owner in 
one jurisdiction may be deemed reasonable by a court because that regulation already exists in an-
other jurisdiction). 
 109. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1947. 
 110. See id. at 1940–41 (stating that the Wisconsin law was enacted in 1976 and the property was 
conveyed to the Murrs in 1994 and 1995).  This is not to suggest that eighteen years is an inadequate 
duration; instead, it points out that the Court invoked a longer duration from a different place osten-
sibly because it would make the property owners look even less reasonable.  Id. at 1947. 
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merger provisions was the fact that Great Neck Estates, New York, passed a 
merger provision in 1926111—some 1,185 miles and numerous decades away 
from the site.112  Though it is too early to tell whether lower courts will en-
gage in similar cross-state comparisons to determine what an owner should 
have anticipated about property units,113 the centrality of reasonableness and 
likeliness in the new Murr test at least makes convergence more plausible.114 
Murr raises the prospect that other states’ property laws could be used to 
contract the scope of protection for property owners.115  However, courts 
have often used laws from other states in the opposite way: to expand or 
guarantee protection to owners when a state denies the existence of a 
right.116  A long line of Supreme Court precedent indicates that states may 
not roll back recognition of property to “sidestep the Takings Clause by dis-
avowing traditional property interests long recognized under state law.”117  
Just as there are ambiguities in what factors determine “reasonableness,” 
there is a latent ambiguity in this quotation: does the term “traditional” af-
ford constitutional protection only to interests previously recognized within 
a particular state, interests reaching some federally recognized bar for what 
property is, or interests traditionally recognized in most states but denied in 
the site where the alleged taking has occurred?  Some court decisions have 
suggested it may be the last of these options.118  In one takings case, a Ninth 
 
 111. Brief of Amici Curiae Nat’l Ass’n of Ctys. et al. in Support of Respondents at 9, Murr v. 
Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933 (2017) (No. 15-214), 2016 WL 3383223, at *9. 
 112. Driving Directions from Great Neck, N.Y, to St. Croix Cty., Wis., GOOGLE MAPS, 
http://maps.google.com (follow “Get Directions” hyperlink; then search “A” for “Great Neck, New 
York” and search for “B” for “St. Croix County, Wisconsin”; then follow “Get Directions” hyper-
link). 
 113. See JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 1101–02 (9th ed. 2017) (noting divergence in ear-
ly scholarly reactions to the Murr decision). 
 114. See Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1945–46 (discussing a number of factors that involve reasonableness 
and likeliness). 
 115. See Brady, supra note 20, at 56 (“Murr invites courts and litigants to define protected consti-
tutional property by reference to the law and regulation of other states, undermining the security of 
interests that would otherwise appear stable under a single jurisdiction’s rules.”). 
 116. Id. at 59–60. 
 117. Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 167 (1998); see also Loretto v. Teleprompter 
Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 439 (1982) (stating that “the government does not have un-
limited power to redefine property rights”). 
 118. But see Vandevere v. Lloyd, 644 F.3d 957, 966–67 (9th Cir. 2011) (using only Alaska law in 
deciding whether fishing entry permits were property); Quinn v. Syracuse Model Neighborhood 
Corp., 613 F.2d 438, 448 (2d Cir. 1980) (noting that “the state may not magically declare an interest 
to be ‘Non property’ after the fact for Fourteenth Amendment purposes if, for example, a longstand-
ing pattern of practice has established an individual’s entitlement to a particular governmental bene-
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Circuit panel recognized as property the interest accrued on principal be-
longing to prisoners, notwithstanding a state statute designating that interest 
as publicly owned, on the basis that the “interest follows principal” rule en-
joys “near-universal endorsement by American courts—including Califor-
nia’s.”119  More recently, that same circuit found that Washington teachers 
have a protected property right in daily interest (denied to them by a state 
policy change) despite the state’s position that there was no law conferring 
such a property right, noting the “common law pedigree” of the “rule that 
interest accrues” daily and citing cases from Georgia, Maryland, New York, 
and Pennsylvania to support their finding that property had indeed been af-
fected.120 
The use of multistate law here gives rise to the puzzle: the Takings 
Clause would be a nullity if constitutional protection only attached to what a 
state affirmatively recognizes as property because a state could simply get 
around the compensation requirement by claiming no property exists.121  If a 
state tries to extinguish a property right through that loophole, how should 
courts decide whether to recognize one?  Scholars have generally endorsed 
the idea of the federal bar: state-specific law creates the relationships and 
rights that either rise or fail to become protected property as a matter of fed-
eral constitutional law.122  But some courts are evidently using the law of 
multiple states to define where that federal bar should be located.123  This 
example neatly indicates some of the difficult questions associated with 
convergence. Perhaps multijurisdictional law should be used to compose the 
lower limit: a set of property rights that no state can eliminate without trig-
gering the compensation requirement.124  Takings protection would be inef-
fective without some baseline.  But if multijurisdictional law sets a floor, 
should it be used to construct a ceiling?125  The upper limit of constitutional 
 
fit,” but evaluating only New York law to determine existence of that interest). 
 119. Schneider v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr., 151 F.3d 1194, 1201 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 120. Fowler v. Guerin, 899 F.3d 1112, 1118 (9th Cir. 2018). 
 121. See Stern, supra note 33, at 288 n.31. 
 122. See Brady, supra note 20, at 59–60; Merrill, supra note 5, at 927; Stern, supra note 33, at 
287. 
 123. See Brady, supra note 20, at 60. 
 124. Id. at 59-60 (noting that the “Court has been skeptical about declining constitutional protec-
tion to an interest when some positive state law declares it is not property, even though other positive 
state law seems to treat it as such”). 
 125. See  DAVID A. DANA & THOMAS W. MERRILL, PROPERTY: TAKINGS 64–67 (2002).  Along 
with David Dana, Thomas Merrill suggested in several writings that there must be a ceiling to avoid 
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property protection in takings law has generally received less attention than 
the floor,126 and the phenomenon of convergence directly raises the question 
of whether multijurisdictional law should furnish some upper boundary on 
the sorts of interests that will be protected.127 
It is worth noting here that the effects of convergence on property own-
ers do not necessarily cut in a single direction.  When it comes to defining 
what counts as constitutional property, convergence might help property 
owners in a state that is declining to recognize an interest by inviting courts 
to fashion one in the absence of specific state law.128  Conversely, conver-
gence might hurt owners in states that have unusual forms of property or 
outlier rules affecting the appropriate unit for the takings analysis because it 
might be unreasonable to rely on those fragile interests in light of the rules in 
other jurisdictions.129  Likewise, when it comes to examining the reasona-
bleness of an owner’s expectations, courts could limit takings protection by 
counting a range of regulations from different states as constraints rendering 
an owner’s expectations implausible or else enhance takings protection by 
discounting an unusual preexisting regulation due to the absence of that rule 
in other states.130  Whether courts use other states’ laws as swords or shields 
for property owners, when property interests or background laws are set by 
some sort of majority rule, it threatens to blunt one of the supposed benefits 
of allocating authority over property rules to the states.131  One of the virtues 
 
the “too much property” problem which would result from states expanding the coverage of property 
to make more actions takings in undesirable and manipulative ways.  See id.; Merrill supra note 5, at 
935 (proposing a federal constitutional definition of Takings Clause property that does not derive 
from the rules of multiple states). 
 126. See Brady, supra note 18, at 1227 (noting paucity of work on whether doctrinal or other con-
straints “reduce the costs of constitutional property innovation by courts in takings law”). 
 127. See Brady, supra note 20, at 65 (explaining that there is some precedent that suggests federal 
constitutional property law acts as a ceiling). 
 128. See id. (explaining that Supreme Court takings cases could be read “to establish that federal 
constitutional property is a floor: the Constitution will recognize as property certain interests, even 
when the state would try to wriggle out from them through invoking dubious positive law”). 
 129. See id. at 68–69 (“[I]f a state is an outlier in recognizing a new form of property, . . . any 
good government lawyer litigating a regulatory takings claim [can] marshal evidence from across 
time and space to make a new regulation seem reasonable and to make owner expectations look un-
reasonable.”). 
 130. See id. at 67. 
 131. See id. at 69 (“The benefits of constitutional property federalism—the democracy-enhancing, 
welfare-enhancing, and efficiency-enhancing effects of competition and innovation among the 
states—are blunted by the threat that the Constitution will protect only a uniform set of interests with 
the weight of multistate law and regulation behind them.”).  
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of property federalism is supposed to be experimentation and innovation, but 
convergence raises the prospect that new interests or innovative regulations 
might be squelched as “unreasonable” or given limited effect because of the 
very fact that they are outliers.132 
In short, the Court has often suggested that the relevant background law 
for defining constitutionally protected property interests and for measuring 
whether a regulation interferes with owner expectations is jurisdiction-
specific.133  But various features of federal takings law discussed in this Sec-
tion allow the laws of one state or the likelihood of regulation to shape pro-
tections for property interests in others.  The structure of federal takings law 
leaves open the possibility for variation: different property interests might be 
recognized in different states, and different regulatory and common law re-
gimes might make an identical regulation a taking in one state but not in an-
other.  However, the Supreme Court has developed tests that permit the va-
lidity of property interests to be determined by cross-state comparisons and 
that measure an owner’s expectations by reference to the law of multiple ju-
risdictions.  This ultimately points toward convergence: the property inter-
ests protected and the sorts of actions that will constitute takings may be 
similar across state boundaries if the background law used in the analysis is 
multijurisdictional or national, rather than limited to a single state. 
B. Converging State Constitutional Standards 
Another opportunity for variation in takings law occurs at a different 
site: state constitutional law.  Nearly all the state constitutions offer protec-
tions against uncompensated takings that parallel the federal Constitution.134  
Some of these provisions are textually different from the federal Takings 
Clause,135 meaning different levels of takings protection are possible under 
the state constitution versus the federal Constitution.136  Moreover, different 
 
 132. See id.; Sterk, supra note 28, at 205 (defending the lack of uniformity in state law takings 
rules). 
 133. See Brady, supra note 20, at 67 (“Years of court opinions have encouraged property owners 
to form expectations based on the law of the jurisdiction in which the property is located.”). 
 134. See Maureen E. Brady, The Damagings Clauses, 104 VA. L. REV. 341, 349, & n.30 (2018) 
(“Every state except North Carolina and Kansas has at least one state constitutional provision pro-
hibiting property from being ‘taken’ without compensation.”). 
 135. See generally id. at 355–60 (describing the history of constitutional provisions that say “tak-
en or damaged” or “injured”). 
 136. Id. at 344 & n.6 (“More than half of the state constitutions contain a takings clause that is 
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histories, constitutional debates, and attitudes within a state might lead state 
tribunals to arrive at different interpretations even of similar constitutional 
takings language.137 
Again, however, state takings law has tended to converge on federal in-
terpretations of the Takings Clause.  Nearly all state courts have opted to 
borrow federal takings tests like the Penn Central test wholesale, rather than 
developing alternative approaches to evaluating the constitutionality of regu-
lations under their own constitutions.138  Only a small handful of states ges-
ture at different or novel takings tests.139 
 
materially different from the federal one, in that it prohibits property from being both ‘taken’ and 
‘damaged’ or ‘injured’ for public use without just compensation.”). 
 137. See People v. Caballes, 851 N.E.2d 26, 43 (Ill. 2006) (citing “textual language (whether there 
is any significant difference between the phrasing of the state and federal provisions), the legislative 
history of the state constitutional provision, preexisting state law, state traditions, and public atti-
tudes” as reasons why interpretations of state constitutions might diverge from interpretations of the 
federal Constitution). 
 138. Phillips v. Montgomery County, 442 S.W.3d 233, 240–42 & n.10 (Tenn. 2014) (citing a sub-
stantial number of state courts that have borrowed the federal takings test).  See Animas Valley Sand 
& Gravel, Inc. v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 38 P.3d 59, 64 (Colo. 2001) (en banc); Haw. Hous. Auth. v. 
Lyman, 704 P.2d 888, 896 (Haw. 1985); Hampton v. Metro. Water Reclamation Dist. of Greater 
Chicago, 57 N.E.3d 1229, 1240 (Ill. 2016); State v. Kimco of Evansville, Inc., 902 N.E.2d 206, 210 
(Ind. 2009); Harms v. City of Sibley, 702 N.W.2d 91, 97 (Iowa 2005); Buhmann v. State, 201 P.3d 
70, 85 (Mont. 2008) (“[A] takings analysis based on federal law under Penn Central or Lucas is to 
be applied to takings claims whether brought under the U.S. or Montana Constitutions.”); Mansoldo 
v. State, 898 A.2d 1018, 1023 (N.J. 2006); Wild Rice River Estates v. City of Fargo, 705 N.W.2d 
850, 856 (N.D. 2005); Cereghino v. State ex rel. State Highway Comm’n, 370 P.2d 694, 697 (Or. 
1962); United Artists’ Theater Circuit, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 635 A.2d 612, 616 (Pa. 1993); 
Zealy v. City of Waukesha, 548 N.W.2d 528, 531–32 (Wis. 1996); Josephine L. Ennis, Comment, 
Making Room: Why Inclusionary Zoning Is Permissible under Washington’s Tax Preemption Statute 
and Takings Framework, 88 WASH. L. REV. 591, 617 (2013) (noting that Washington courts have 
oscillated between reading its constitution more broadly and in lockstep with the federal Constitu-
tion); see also Fields v. Sarasota Manatee Airport Auth., 953 F.2d 1299, 1308 (11th Cir. 1992); 
McCarran Int’l Airport v. Sisolak, 137 P.3d 1110, 1131 (Nev. 2006) (Becker, J., dissenting in part 
and concurring in part); Charles E. Cohen, Takings Analysis of Police Destruction of Innocent Own-
ers’ Property in the Course of Law Enforcement: The View from Five State Supreme Courts, 34 
MCGEORGE L. REV. 1, 1, 22 (2002) (noting the use of federal precedents in takings law in Califor-
nia, Texas, Minnesota, Oklahoma, and Iowa). 
 139. See DeCook v. Rochester Int’l Airport Joint Zoning Bd., 796 N.W.2d 299, 305–06 (Minn. 
2011) (noting court’s history of sometimes relying on federal constitutional tests and other times 
relying on test developed solely for evaluating takings under state constitution); Coast Range Coni-
fers, L.L.C. v. State ex rel. Or. State Bd. of Forestry, 117 P.3d 990, 997 (Or. 2005) (en banc) (noting 
Oregon rule that taking occurs only where the “regulation leaves the owner with [no] economically 
viable use of the property”); Utah Dep’t of Transp. v. Admiral Beverage Corp., 275 P.3d 208, 215 
(Utah 2011) (describing the test as “any substantial interference with private property which destroys 
or materially lessens its value, or by which the owner’s right to its use and enjoyment is in any sub-
stantial degree abridged or destroyed” (quoting Stockdale v. Rio Grande W. Ry. Co., 77 P. 849, 852 
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The adoption of federal tests may make sense when the constitutional 
text is identical,140 but it is harder to explain convergence when there are ma-
jor textual differences between the state and federal takings clauses.141  In a 
context I have explored in previous work—when the state takings clauses 
provide compensation not just for property “taken,” but also for property 
“damaged” or “injured”—state courts have borrowed from one another in 
interpreting their constitutional provisions, meaning a single test for whether 
a “damaging” has occurred is the dominant approach in most states.142  This 
is the case even when there are different enactment histories and other textu-
al variations.143  Furthermore, state courts have found that the addition of 
this “or damaged” language adds little to federal protections in all but the 
most extreme outlying cases.144  In short, in lieu of fifty (or even just two or 
three) different approaches to state takings law, federal precedents are very 
likely to be controlling as a matter of state constitutional interpretation. 
There are exceptions.  Following the backlash to the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Kelo v. City of New London, in which the taking of Suzette Ke-
lo’s house for a proposed private development was upheld as a valid “public 
 
(Utah 1904))); Manufactured Hous. Cmtys. of Wash. v. State, 13 P.3d 183, 187–88 (Wash. 2000) 
(en banc) (describing a mix of state and federal tests).  It is somewhat unclear whether these tests 
result in material differences in state and federal protection.  See, e.g., Ennis, supra note 138, at 617 
(noting that after the Manufactured Housing case in Washington, at least one court continued to fol-
low federal precedents). 
 140. See, e.g., Buhmann, 201 P.3d at 85 (stating that Montana courts take guidance from federal 
case law when applying a takings claim, “a practice that is consistent with that of other states with 
similar or identical language in their state constitutions”). 
 141. See, e.g., DeCook, 796 N.W.2d at 305 (stating that while the takings language of the Minne-
sota Constitution is broader than the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause language, Minnesota courts 
often still apply the federal standard). 
 142. See Brady, supra note 134, at 382–88 (noting that the approach of the Illinois courts to inter-
preting the words “or damaged” was used in nearly every state with a takings clause involving the 
words “damaged” or “injured”).  James Krier and Stewart Sterk have observed that state takings doc-
trine is least harmonious (and the Supreme Court is least frequently cited) in cases involving flood-
ing and government enterprises, cases for which the damagings clauses are ideally suited and for 
which there is no pertinent Supreme Court precedent.  James E. Krier & Stewart E. Sterk, Am Em-
pirical Study of Implicit Takings, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 35, 73–74 (2016). 
 143. Brady, supra note 134, at 388 (“[A] multitude of state supreme courts interpreting damagings 
clauses from Virginia to California noted that the United States Supreme Court had ‘approved’ or 
‘concurred in’ the Illinois holding.”). 
 144. Id. at 388 (noting that interpretations of “or damaged” language in takings clauses rendered 
language “nearly inapplicable to anything except the sorts of physical invasions that would ordinari-
ly qualify as a taking”). But see Dickinson, supra note 15, at 164 n.145 (listing cases where state 
courts have pointed out the “or damaged” textual difference, although my own research suggests this 
is more rhetorical than substantive). 
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use” within the meaning of the Takings Clause,145 many state courts and 
constitutional drafters responded by interpreting or amending their constitu-
tions to make clear that economic development was not a valid “public use” 
under the state constitution for the exercise of the eminent domain power.146  
Other state courts declined to expand protections for property owners, fol-
lowing the Supreme Court in interpreting the “public use” or “public pur-
pose” provisions of their own constitutions broadly.147  This has led to some 
variation in property protection across jurisdictions.148  For this reason, some 
have hailed the post-Kelo response by state actors as a triumph of interstate 
variation: residents can agitate politically for the property protections they 
desire.149  Others have argued that these state responses suffer from a variety 
of infirmities and loopholes that render the responses less successful than 
they appear, demanding a national response.150  Tellingly, many of these in-
firmities are convergent: most post-Kelo statutes or constitutional amend-
ments permit takings when the property is blighted, as that term is broadly 
and similarly defined.151  Nevertheless, the post-Kelo movement is an unu-
sual example of some variation across states and between the state and fed-
eral doctrine in one aspect of takings law, even if the long-term effectiveness 
of that movement is not yet clear or certain.152 
In addition to post-Kelo laws yielding variation in property protection, 
some states have statutes that endeavor to strengthen protection against con-
fiscation above and beyond what the federal Constitution requires.153  Arizo-
na, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, Oregon, and Texas have statutes on the 
books resulting either from voter initiatives or legislation that could be read 
 
 145. 545 U.S. 469, 475, 489-90 (2005). 
 146. See, e.g., Norwood v. Horney, 853 N.E.2d 1115, 1141 (Ohio 2006); Board of Cty. Comm’rs 
of Muskogee Cty. v. Lowery, 136 P.3d 639, 650–51 (Okla. 2006); ILYA SOMIN, THE GRASPING 
HAND: KELO V. CITY OF NEW LONDON AND THE LIMITS OF EMINENT DOMAIN 135–64, 182–83 (2015) 
(cataloging legislative and judicial changes). 
 147. See, e.g., Goldstein v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 921 N.E.2d 164, 170–71 (N.Y. 2009). 
 148. See Ilya Somin, The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to Kelo, 93 MINN. 
L. REV. 2100, 2114, 2115–16 tabls.3 & 4 (2009); see also Dickinson, supra note 15, at 182–97, 212–
19 (describing different post-Kelo innovations and offering explanations for these examples of di-
vergence despite convergence elsewhere in constitutional takings law). 
 149. See Robert C. Ellickson, Federalism and Kelo: A Question for Richard Epstein, 44 TULSA L. 
REV. 751, 762–63 (2009). 
 150. SOMIN, supra note 146, at 136, 141–64, 173–78; Somin, supra note 5, at 87–88. 
 151. SOMIN, supra note 146, at 145–53. 
 152. See Somin, supra note 148, at 2114. 
 153. See Krier & Sterk, supra note 142, at 78. 
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to require compensation for a greater range of government interferences with 
property than federal doctrine does.154  But as an empirical matter, except for 
Oregon, these statutes have had extremely limited effect.155  Courts have 
construed the statutes narrowly, the statutes have generated no significant 
doctrinal innovations, and litigants do not often win additional protection.156  
The prospect of greater degrees of protection in some states rather than oth-
ers by virtue of different legislative protection against confiscation may be a 
matter of appearance rather than reality.157 
To put it simply, apart from different interpretations of the “public use” 
limitation and modest statutory innovations, states often decline to break 
new doctrinal ground as a matter of state takings law or to develop different 
ways of analyzing whether a taking has occurred.158  Instead, interpretations 
of the state takings clauses tend to follow federal law in lockstep.159  In the 
last Section, I suggested convergence within federal takings law may be at-
tributable to the unclear parameters of reasonableness, likelihood, and fore-
seeability in federal takings tests.  The root causes of lockstep interpretation 
in state constitutional law are much harder to determine: judges might be 
persuaded by federal opinions or simply mistaken about the force of federal 
precedents.160  Lockstep interpretation is not at all unique to the takings 
clauses, and state court judges rarely explain why they are adopting federal 
 
 154. Id. at 78–79. 
 155. Id. at 78; see also Dickinson, supra note 15, at 176–82 (finding that “conformity with [feder-
al] regulatory takings doctrine is the norm” even when it comes to state legislation).  Oregon stands 
in contrast: after the enactment of voter-approved initiatives that required compensation whenever 
the market value of property was simply reduced, rather than reduced past some threshold, over 
6850 claims for “government payment or waiver” were filed within three years.  Krier & Sterk, su-
pra note 142, at 80. 
 156. Krier & Sterk, supra note 142, at 78–80. 
 157. See also Somin, supra note 148, at 2105 (stating that twenty-two of the thirty-six state legis-
latures that have enacted reform laws in response to Kelo are mostly symbolic because they provide 
“little or no protection for property owners”). 
 158. See, e.g., Ennis, supra note 138, at 617 (demonstrating Washington courts’ willingness to 
apply the federal standard to state takings clause determinations in spite of the distinction in lan-
guage between the Washington and federal takings clauses). 
 159. See Phillips v. Montgomery County, 442 S.W.3d 233, 240–42 (Tenn. 2014) (providing a list 
of examples of states applying federal standards for a takings claim analysis).  
 160. Joseph Blocher, Reverse Incorporation of State Constitutional Law, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 323, 
338–39 (2011) (noting that state supreme courts may have tended to continue interpreting state con-
stitutions in lockstep even after calls for more robust state constitutionalism “either from force of 
habit, mistaken belief that they were bound by the federal rules, lack of expertise, or simply because 
they agreed with [Supreme Court] reasoning”). 
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precedents, principles, and tests as their own.161  Yet this discussion by the 
Tennessee Supreme Court in 2014 may provide at least some clues: accord-
ing to that court, having a different set of takings rules “would needlessly 
complicate an already complex area of law, increase uncertainty for litigants 
attempting to bring claims under both the federal and state constitutions, and 
place Tennessee at odds with the vast majority of states, nearly all of which 
have already adopted federal takings jurisprudence.”162  Whether these bene-
fits of avoiding complexity outweigh the loss of potentially fruitful experi-
mentation is an open question.  Still, without passing on the normative desir-
ability of any given modification to state takings law, the most important 
observation is that state takings law coheres around the Supreme Court’s 
pronouncements as those have been set out in the federal context.163 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Because states are given primary control over property in our federal 
system,164 there is potential for corresponding variation in state law.165  Yet 
this Essay has demonstrated that there are differences in how that potential 
has borne out.  In the private law context, states still sometimes tailor prop-
erty rights to the things and people in their jurisdiction, recognizing different 
types of interests and placing different sorts of limitations on property rights.  
In the public-law takings context—when individual property owners are not 
squabbling among themselves, but rather defending property interests 
against some government—one can observe a different trajectory. 
Descriptively, the sorts of property interests protected and the back-
ground legal rules used to measure whether a regulation is a taking show 
signs of convergence, both as a matter of federal and of state takings law.  In 
the context of federal takings law, this may be due to the indeterminate fac-
tors affecting the interpretation of terms like “reasonable,” “foreseeable,” 
and “likely” when they are used in federal takings tests.  Because the Consti-
 
 161. James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90 MICH. L. REV. 761, 
792 (1992); see Dickinson, supra note 15, at 198–211 (arguing that simplicity, avoidance, textual 
similarity, and other factors all likely contribute to convergence in takings law). 
 162. Phillips, 442 S.W.3d at 244. 
 163. Id. at 240–42 (listing “an overwhelming majority of states whose constitutions or statutes 
contain provisions similar to the Takings Clause . . . [and that] have used the analytical framework 
developed by the United States Supreme Court when adjudicating regulatory takings claims”). 
 164. See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 2, at 74 n.1. 
 165. Id. at 99–100.  
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tution protects interests created by the state, the federal Takings Clause 
could protect different interests in different states.  Likewise, the federal 
Clause might require compensation for regulations differently because dif-
ferent states’ background laws and circumstances might render a single 
regulation unexpected and draconian in one jurisdiction but totally expected 
and predictable in another.  But as a practical matter, some courts have in-
terpreted “reasonableness” to be shaped by laws from multiple states, yield-
ing a more uniform or national set of background principles from which pro-
tected property interests and inherent limitations on title are drawn.  This 
makes it more likely that federal takings law will protect similar interests 
and will find similar regulations constitutionally permissible or infirm, even 
in states with somewhat different underlying rules. 
Likewise, state takings law is also marked by convergence.  The phe-
nomenon of lockstep interpretation, well known in other constitutional con-
texts, is also present in takings law.  Many states adopt federal takings prec-
edents wholesale as a matter of state constitutional interpretation.  Even 
when there are differences between the state and the federal constitutional 
text governing confiscation and devaluation of property, states tend to inter-
pret their constitutions both in ways similar to one another and in ways that 
provide limited variations on protection. 
These emerging trends in property law tee up questions about the merits 
of variation directly.  There may well be plausible reasons for takings law to 
yield more homogenous results across state lines than, say, the law of ad-
verse possession or some unique easement might.  On the other hand, varia-
tion itself may be especially in need of protection when a state has extended 
an outlier right by its own actions and tries to use another state’s rules to 
prevent that right from being asserted against it.  This Essay noted how vari-
ation persists in underlying state property rules in private law, whereas de-
velopments in takings law may be eroding it.  The task of justifying these 
different trajectories remains for another day. 
 
